“Islam, not social factors driving radicalism”

by

 

Robert Gorter, et al.

Robert Gorter, MD, PhD, is emeritus professor of Medicine of the University of California San Francisco Medical School (UCSF), etc.

Now that almost forty-six years have elapsed since the attack on the Munich Olympics in September of 1972, and almost seventeen years have gone by since the 9/11 attacks in September of 2001, and throughout that entire time there has been virtually nonstop scholarly research regarding the motivation for such attacks by legions of scholars throughout the world, it is probably fair to say that there are now three relatively established, uncontroverted, and if not totally indisputable facts about the belief system and practices of Islam, all of which apparently flow directly from the teachings and life example of Muhammad himself and his early followers:

(1) that the active military conquest of the world and subjugation of non-Muslims is a religious duty for all Muslims each according to their own unique circumstances and capacities;

(2) that any Muslim who is killed in the process of making war against non-Muslims is absolutely guaranteed admission to paradise; and

(3) that the commission of atrocities against non-Muslims is part of a larger strategy calculated to induce fear and terror in non-Muslims for the purpose of making it faster and easier to conquer, convert, or enslave them. How best to defend against the 1400-year-old global juggernaut of Islamic jihad is not immediately clear, but a careful study of its ideology and history seems like an important first step. If there is any one “lesson” to be learned it is probably that Islamic jihad should never be underestimated. As the USA president Thomas Jefferson said, “the price of freedom is eternal vigilance.”

Sociologist Olivier Galland has slammed many of his fellow academics for having a myopic view of radicalization in France, saying that the effect of Islam is more important than social factors like poverty.

Finally, an expert in France is saying what Jihad Watch and other counter-jihad sources have been saying for some time. It is jihad indoctrination, rooted in calls for violence against infidels for rewards in paradise that is behind “radicalization in France.”

The greater the carnage, the greater the reward.

The world is divided in two, according to the doctrine to which not all, but a significant enough number of Muslims subscribe: the House of War and the House of Islam. This doctrine requires the subjugation of disbelievers, regarding them as lower than animals, as per the Qur’an (8:55). Such actions as casting terror into the hearts of disbelievers, taking infidel women at will and waging jihad against disbelievers are all mandated in the Qur’an for those Muslims who choose to heed and obey the text.

islam

Olivier Galland, French sociologist (*December 8th, 1961)

Let’s hope that more academics can abandon political correctness and follow the example of Galland, for France’s and Europe’s sake. Last week in Paris, 1,600 residents demanded action against the Muslim migrant street gangs that are terrorizing them, and a new poll showed that a vast majority of French citizens overwhelmingly back the deportation of jihadi suspects, as well as “banning radical Islam.”

Yet despite all that, a French politician was fined $6,150 for mentioning the phrase “migrant invasion,” even though that is precisely what is happening in France and other EU countries. It is also known as the hijrah.

Sociologist Olivier Galland expressed the problem with jihadists adeptly:

“We find a divergence and the existence of a cultural divide between young Muslims and their comrades. For them, religion dominates the secular world: this is what we have called ‘religious absolutism.’

“Religious absolutism” among Muslims is the Salafist paradigm. Proponents of this ideology do not want to integrate, but rather see France as part of the House of War to be subjugated by Islam.

islam

Professor Gilles Kepel, Chair, Middle East and Mediterranean Studies, Institut d’Études Politiques de Paris (Sciences Po)  (*June 30th, 1955)

Top scholar Gilles Kepel has warned that Europe could be heading down the path to civil war because of the formation of radical Islamic parallel societies.

Gilles Kepel has made significant contributions to the understanding of Islam as an ideological, political, and social force, both in the Muslim world and within immigrant communities in the West. He has focused in particular on the fundamentalist phenomenon, showing that since the 1970s fundamentalism has been a crucial force throughout the world and across religions—among Protestants, Catholics, and Jews as well as Muslims. Fundamentalism is to a large extent a negative reaction to modernity, which it views as an external corruption that must be eradicated in order to return to an earlier age of religious purity and simplicity.

Sociologist Olivier Galland has slammed many of his fellow academics for having a myopic view of radicalization in France, saying that the effect of Islam is more important than social factors like poverty.

After the Bataclan attacks in 2015, Galland launched a survey of high school pupils on the subject of radicalism and found that Muslim students, in particular, were the most tolerant of violence committed in the name of religion.

The November 2015 Paris attacks were a series of well-coordinated terrorist attacks that occurred on Friday, 13 November 2015 in Paris, France and the city’s northern suburb, Saint-Denis. Beginning at 21:16 CET, three suicide bombers struck outside the Stade de France in Saint-Denis, during a football match. This was followed by several mass shootings and a suicide bombing, at cafés and restaurants. Gunmen carried out another mass shooting and took hostages at an Eagles of Death Metal concert in the Bataclan theatre, leading to a stand-off with police. The attackers were shot or blew themselves up when police raided the theatre.

The results of the study, which were published in early April 2018, showed that Muslim pupils were often much more illiberal than their non-Muslim counterparts and Galland has claimed that it is the effect of the religion of Islam, rather than simply social factors that drive radicalization among them.

“We find a divergence and the existence of a cultural divide between young Muslims and their comrades. For them, religion dominates the secular world: this is what we have called ‘religious absolutism’,” Galland said.

“This conception of religion is linked to cultural anti-liberalism, which we measured with several questions, including one on homosexuality: more young Muslims than others do not see it as a normal way of living one’s sexuality,” he added, but stressed: “This does not mean, of course, that all are ultra-radical or that they are potential terrorists.”

According to Galland, the migrant-heavy suburbs of Paris contained the largest amounts of radicalism.

“In some institutions, the proportion of ‘absolutists’ rises to more than 40%. There is also a ‘segregation’ effect: when the rate of Muslim students is very high in a high school, they are more radical than elsewhere. But everywhere, Muslim students are more religiously radical than others,” he said.

Galland also added that only 8% of Christians in the survey advocated any form of religious violence, while the number of Muslim students was approx. 38%.

The study falls in line with what other radical Islamic experts in France have warned, including top scholar Gilles Kepel, who has warned that Europe could be heading down the path to civil war because of the formation of radical Islamic parallel societies…..

On day, not that long ago, Gilles Kepel, a French political scientist, was at home in Paris brushing his teeth one morning last June when his cellphone rattled on the sink. It was a text from a journalist he knew: “I’m sorry to tell you this, but you’re on the death list.” Kepel turned toward his TV, which was already on, and the top story eliminated any confusion. A French-born jihadi named Larossi Abballa had murdered a police officer and his wife in a town west of Paris and then delivered a macabre speech on Facebook Live — with the couple’s 3-year-old child cowering nearby — in which he called for the killing of seven public figures. The French media omitted the details, but an Interior Ministry official soon called with confirmation: Kepel’s name was near the top of the hit list. His initial feeling, he later told me, was “as if the subject I’ve been studying for 35 years had turned around to strike at me.” Within hours, he had a government security team assigned to guard him 24 hours a day. A similar death warrant was issued against him later that summer, elevating the sense of danger.

The threats came at an unusual turn in Kepel’s career. He has long been a prominent figure in the French intellectual world, a scholar whose face — a distinctive, narrow-eyed mask of polished sobriety — is often seen on TV news shows. But recently he has assumed a far more combative stance. Kepel has argued that much of France’s left-leaning intelligentsia fails to understand the nature of the threat the country faces — not just from foreign terrorists but also from the Islamist provocateurs in its exurban ghettos, the banlieues. Unlike the Islam-bashing polemicists who haunt French opinion pages, Kepel brings a lifetime of scholarship to this argument. He has always been careful to distinguish mainstream Islam from the hard-line Islamist ideologues of the banlieues, who have no real equivalent in the United States. He has long been a man of the left; his wife’s family is from North Africa, and he has no sympathy for the xenophobia of the right-wing National Front. But he believes that radical Islamists are trying to shred France’s social fabric and foster a civil war, and that many leftists are unwittingly playing into their hands. This view has made him a target for almost everyone.

Kepel’s assault against what he calls “Islamo-gauchism” has earned him an unusual role during a French presidential campaign that has seemed, at times, to be a referendum on the country’s tortured relationship with its Muslim immigrants and with Islam writ large. The string of terrorist attacks that intensified two years ago in Paris has fed a current of national anxiety, and it has only grown worse with the recognition that hundreds of French citizens fighting alongside ISIS — more than those from any other European country — will be trickling homeward from Syria and Iraq, many of them to French prisons that are widely considered to be incubators for terror plots. The National Front candidate, Marine Le Pen, has called for drastic reductions in immigration and the expulsion of all illegal immigrants, in terms that have been echoed by the Trump administration. She regularly invokes radical Islam and globalization as two linked evils threatening France. The mainstream right-wing candidate, François Fillon, published a book late last year titled “Defeating Islamic Totalitarianism.” On the left, the candidates have issued a confused mix of panicky alarms about terrorism and denunciations of racism and Islamophobia. At times, the candidates seem to suggest that France’s very identity is at stake.

professor

Jean-Pierre Chevènement (*March 9th, 1939)

The elder statesman Jean-Pierre Chevènement, in a recent book, wrote of the attacks and their aftermath: “Isn’t the essence of the matter that we don’t know today who we are or what we want to do?” The cover shows a storm-tossed ship flying le tricolor.

Some of Kepel’s fellow intellectuals contend that the election should be an opportunity to look inward instead of blaming Islamists. The political scientist Olivier Roy argues that France’s rigorously secular government and society have helped create an airless environment that has allowed jihadism to thrive. Roy and others on the left appear to believe that the terrorist violence of the past two years has illuminated fatal flaws at the heart of French political culture: too rigid, too hierarchical, too insistent on imposing cultural conformity on an increasingly diverse population. This critique is sometimes echoed by critics in Britain and the United States, who say France needs to get over its horror of commune autarisme — the formation of ethnic and social enclaves — and loosen the sense of what it means to be authentically French. In other words, France would be better off adopting a more hands-off, multiculturalist approach to the head scarf and other Islamic cultural symbols.

Kepel scoffs at this argument, and sometimes derides its proponents as naïfs or even Islamist fellow-travelers. He is more than an observer to this debate: Kepel was a member of the commission that helped create France’s controversial 2004 law banning Islamic head scarves and other religious symbols and clothing in public schools, and remains proud of that role. He believes that eroding French state secularism, known as laïcité, would lead to a “Balkanization of Europe along religious and ethnic lines,” with a Muslim voting bloc, Muslim schools and a hardening of quasi-separatist communities of various religions. With his career coming to an end — he is 61 — he is making these arguments with ever-greater urgency. He has repeatedly dismissed claims of widespread Islamophobia in French society as fraudulent, saying the word has become little more than a rhetorical club used by Islamists to rally their base.

 

 

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *